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Introduction: Essence同Function and the Prominence of 
”Theological”Debate in the Korean Philosophico・Religious
Tradition 
One of the most predominant characteristics of Korean philosophical 
thought is its proclivity for subtle intellectual debate regarding 
fundamental p凶osophico-religious principles-that is, phenomenological 
issues that deal with the origins of evil and goodness, soteriology, ethics, 
and so forth. This Korean tendency toward debate of philosophical issues 
tends to fal into a well-defined and distinctly repeated pattern of 
discourse: that of essence-function (che-yong体用）.1
1 This is not to say that the intellectual history of Korea’s two closest neighbors, Japan and China, 
is not marked with ”theological”debate. The difference, however, is in the degree to which the 
tradition has come to be define by such debates. That is, when one begins to study Buddhism 
and Confucianism in the context of Korean intellectual history, one will learn early on about the 
sudden-gradual debate, the text引 1titextdebate, four-seven debate, etc., rather soon. Subsequent 
studies will quite oft巴nbe contextualized by these debates. The same tendency do巴snot seem to 
be as prevalent in the case of Japan and China 
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Philosophical confrontation become a notable dimension within Korean 
Buddhism, especially after the development of the Sean （禅） school. The 
advent of this school in Korea brought about a situation of ideological 
conflict between it and the older, established, doctrinal schools of 
Buddhism. Adherents of the newly imported meditation school often 
expressed the opinion that textual studies were an impediment to the 
attainment of the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. While this conflict 
regarding the relationship between scholarly exegesis and meditation 
practice had its precedents in China, and was the su句ectof treatment by 
Tang scholars such as Zongmi （宗密 780-841),it was not really a debate 
that was carried on extensively within the Chinese Chan schools 
themselves. One either belonged to a Chan school where this view was 
accepted, or one belonged to a doctrinal school. 
In Korea, on the other hand, because of the integrated makeup that the 
Seon school gradually assumed, the relation of the doctrinal teachings 
vis-a-vis meditation practice was an issue that was discoursed upon in 
almost every generation. 百learguments for the pro-meditation group 
were initiated by early Seon teachers such as Muyeom （無染 800-888)who 
stridently criticized the doctrinal (gyo) approach, and he was joined and 
followed by numerous others for generations.2 What eventually prevailed 
was a discourse from within the tradition that sought aロliddleground, 
advocating an approach to cultivation that included both meditation and 
textual study in a balanced format. This sort of position was argued for 
through the centuries by Buddhist leaders such as Gyunyeo （均如
923-973), Euicheon （義天 1055-1101), Jinul （知的 1158-1210), Gihwa 
(1376-1433己和）， and Hy吋eong（休静 1520-1604).
A roughly p町alelKorean intra-Buddhist debate, which involved many 
of the same participants as the meditational vs. doctrinal debate, can be 
2 See Buswell, Tracing Back the Radianc, pp. 13-14 
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seen in the controversy reg訂dingwhether enlightenment was something 
that was attained sudde吋yor gradually. This argument also has its roots 
in China, but after fading away on the continent, was taken up with 
fervor in Korea, where it has continued to spur debate within the Korean 
Jogye school down to the present day.3 
The greatest of the Korean debates regarding the nature of the mind, 
which has much in common with the Buddhist doctrinal/meditational and 
sudden/ gradual disputes, is that of the Neo Confucian question on the 
relation of the four beginnings四端 andseven feelings七情 thatwas 
first taken up between Yi Hwang （李混， Toegye退渓； 1501-1570)and Yi I 
（李現， Yulgok栗谷； 1536-1584),and later r司oinedby their disciples.百世s
debate centered on subtle points of inte中retationconcerned with the e訂ly
Mencian position on the nature of human goodness, the ori伊lsof evil, 
and the relative degree of interiority / exteriority of the feelings (of both 
good and evil quality) that are produced in the processes of interaction 
with the environment.4 
The above-mentioned debates can be shown to be framed by a repeated 
thematic pattern, summarized by: (1) the degree to which the goodness, 
purity, or enlightenment, that exists within the human mind can said to 
be innate, or even originally complete; (2) based on this component of 
innate purity, what kind of factors （丘町） are necess町 tobring about 
its completion, and (3) what the relationship is between the innate (good, 
enlightened, pure) nature of the mind, and the discordance, affliction, and 
evil that we see manifested in everyday human activity. No matter what 
the degree of divergence in the interpretation of the various aspects of the 
above-expressed pattern, the soteriological discourses of the main East 
3 Se巴， forexample, Seongcheol's Seonmun jeongno禅門正路， andSung Bae Park’s Buddhist Faith and 
Sudden Enlightenment. 
4 For a complete account of, and translation of the major contributions to this debate, see Michael 
Kalton' s The Four-Seven Debate. 
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Asian philosophical/religious systems are without fail subsumed within 
this framework. They al basically agree on the point that the fundamental 
nature of the mind is good, and that there is a problem somewhere that 
leads that fundamental nature not to express itself properlyto function 
discordantly. Thus, it is a problem that manifests within the conceptual 
framework of essence-function. 
In the case of the developing character of East Asian Buddhism, the 
most prominent points of difference among the various doctrinal schools 
(and later as well among the Chan schools) can be seen, despite their 
differences, to be circumscribed by this same logical 仕amework. 百1e
argument for the suddenness of e吋ightenmentcan be seen as a way of 
viewing the mind that pays greater attention to its essence, and less 
attention to its function, while the position of gradualists would be 
opposite to this. In like manner, scholars such as Jinul and Gihwa, who 
argued for a program of practice that harmoniously combined meditation 
and textual study, did so by claiming that while meditative abso中tion 
was equivalent to being attuned with the essence of the mind (of 
enlightenment) the scriptural co中us could be seen as a function of 
enlightenment.百1erefore,they recommended both approaches to religious 
cultivation. 
From the perspective of the actual terminology used in the argument, it 
is the language of the Four-Seven debate that most clearly demonstrates 
the tacit (or perhaps even unconscious) agreement between the two parties 
that the discourse must be contextualized within the che-yong framework. 
百四 cruxof this debate lies in determining exactly where it is that the 
four beginnings and seven feelings are to be located within the spectrum 
of gradations. between yi (Ch. li理） and gi (Ch. qi気）， concepts that are 
derived from the Huayan li (principle理） and shi (phenomena事）， which 
in tum constitute a prime example of the development of philosophical 
categories based on a basic worldview of essence-function. 
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The Korean Buddhist圃ConfucianDebate 
In this paper, we will treat another si伊ificantdebate that occurred in 
the Korean philosophical arena-that which occurred between the 
Confucians and the Buddhists in the late Goryeo and early Joseon 
periods. In particular, we will look at the two most important, roughly 
contemporary, representative works that emerged from each side. These 
訂ethe Bulssi japbyeon （仏氏雑弁 Arrayof Critiques of Buddhism) by 
Jeong D吋eon （鄭道伝 1342-1398),5 and the Hyeonjeong non （顕正論
Articulation of the Correct ［同N])by Gihwa (Harr由eoDeuktong酒虚得
通）.6 These two works do not actually constitute a direct, ongoing 
dialogue between contemporaries in the way of the Four-Seven debate, 
since Gihwa wrote his piece after Jeong’s death. But since the Hyeonjeong 
non is clearly a response to the ]apbyeon, as well as a response to the 
entire gamut of critiques lodged by Confucians against Buddhists since 
the dawn of th位 conflicts,it can certainly be categorized as one of the 
m司orphilosophical debates of the Korean仕adition.百世scase is especially 
interesting, since, even though the argument is being conducted between 
two distinct, competing philosophical/ religious traditions, the degree to 
which both sides unconsciously ground their basic arguments in the 
structure of essence-function makes an even clearer point about the role of 
that s仕uctureas an a priori framework of classical Korean philosophical 
debate. Since I have already discussed the general background of the 
developments leading up to this debate in terms of their precedents in 
China and Korea in a couple of places,7 including the events leading up 
5 Jeong is commonly referred to by his pen name Sambong参峯.His writings are collected in the 
Sambongjip参峯集．
6 The Hyeonjeong non is included in the Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo vol. 7, pp. 217-225 
7 In the seventh chapter of my dissertation, and in the recent article吋heBuddhist-Confucian 
Conflict in the Early Choson and Kihwa’s Syncretic Response: The Hy6n j6ng non” 
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to the production of both works, I will only summarize that background 
briefly here. 
Jeong D司eon can be seen as the product of a long developing 
Neo-Confucian tradition, that had as a m司orpart of its raison d’etre the 
need to expose the Buddhist teachings as being harmful, both to the 
moral well-being of the individual, and to the stability of society in 
general. Although Confucian criticisms of Buddhism start as far back as 
the Tang dynasty with Hanyu （韓愈 768-824),8it is really with the 
appearance of the Song NeoーConfucianmasters, most importantly the 
Cheng brothers (Chenghao程頴 1032-1085,and Chengyi程顕 1033-110η
and Zhuxi （朱烹 1130-1200)that the critique takes on final philosophical 
form. The target of the Neo-Confucian critique was Chan Buddhism in 
p訂 tic叫ar,the sect which had distinguished itself for its ostensive r司ection
of book learning and societal norms, with these being characterized as 
impediment訂yto the enlightenment experience. 
To the scholar well-versed in Buddhist doctrine, one cannot but be 
puzzled at times at the simplistic level of argumentation of some of the 
Neo-Confucian criticisms, given the otherwise obvious sophistication of 
such thinkers as the Cheng brothers and Zhuxi. There are just too many 
basic argt江nentscontained in the Buddhist doctrine that would have 
answered their criticisms, which these men, being as learned as they were, 
they could not have been oblivious to. For ex田nple,although it is often 
expressed at a relatively subtle level of discourse, Buddhism (and 
especially Chan) regula均 seeks to undo its own tendencies toward 
escapism and nihilism, based in a well-developed doctrine of expedient 
means that allows for, and in places even strongly advocates, ful 
participation in daily afairs. So we can only infer that either the 
Neo-Confucian critics were badly exaggerating things to make their own 
8 Hanyu's two best-known criticisms of Buddhism are the Origin of the Way；，原道 andMemorial on 
the Buddha’s Bone；論仏骨表 SeeGregory 1995: 35司36
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point seem to have a basis, or that the Chan practices prevalent in the 
Song, and their attendant rhetoric, were sufficiently imbalanced toward the 
arcane and nihilistic such as to draw this kind of consistent criticism. 
Whatever the actual circumstances may have been, it is clear that while 
the Chan schools were drawing continuous vehement criticism from their 
Confucian contemporaries, there was no serious, sustained attempt made 
at selιdefense, at least in written form. Why this lack of effort toward 
protec出 gthe reputation of the sa噌加？ One possible explanation is that 
in view of the general character of Chan with its self-proclaimed distaste 
for discursive thinking, such a debate was outside the purview of what a 
Chan teacher was supposed to be doing. Or, perhaps the Buddhists were 
suf白cientlyconfident enough of the status of their廿aditionto believe that 
such diatribes were never going to have any real concrete effect, in terms 
of government authorized restrictions. It may have also been the case that 
the vibrant energy of the Neo-Confucian movement, coupled with the 
bright young minds that were attracted to it, were simply too much for 
the αlan leaders to contend with. Or, taking this latter supposition a step 
further, we might even want to give serious consideration to Jeong 
D吋eon’sclaim that the Chan practices of non-reliance on words and 
letters had resulted in the impairment, through disuse, of the Channist’s 
intellectual capacities. 
During the two centuries after Zhuxi, a roughly analogous 
confrontational situation developed in the Goryeo, but which had some 
distinctive aspects. The most important difference between the two 
scenarios was the markedly greater degree to which the Korean Buddhist 
establishment was embedded into the state power structure as compared 
with the situation in the Song. Leaders of the s同g加 ownedtracts of 
tax-free teπitory, traded in slaves and other commodities, and were 
influential at al levels of government. There were too many monks who 
were ordained for the wrong reasons, and coπuption was rampant. Thus, 
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the ideological fervor with which Neo-Confucianism rose in Korea had a 
special dimension, since ire of the critics of Buddhism was fueled not 
only by the earlier philosophical arguments of the Cheng brothers and 
Zhuxi, but was exacerbated by the extent of the present co町uption.There 
was a decadent, stumbling government in place, supported by, and 
supporting, a somewhat dissolute religious organization. 
With this less-than-exemplary Buddhist establishment as its t町get,the 
Korean Neo-Confucian anti-Buddhist polemic grew during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, reaching its peak at the end of the fourteenth century, 
when, with the 1392 coup dモtatled by the Confucian-backed Yi Seonggye 
（李成桂 1335-1408)the Buddhists were thrust out of power. The Buddhists 
would, over time, lose much of their influence with the goveロunent,
becoming far less visible in the metropolitan areas. 
官官自nalpolemical push for the Buddhist purge came in the form of 
the essays of Jeong D吋eon,Yi’s main political advisor, who would play a 
m司orrole in the development of the political structure of the new Joseon 
d戸1asty.9Jeong wrote a few philosophical essays that were critical of 
Buddhism, but his final, and most directly anti-Buddhist polemical work 
(completed just before his assassination in 1398) was the Bulssi japbyeon)D 
In his anti-Buddhist tracts Jeong focused on comparisons of Buddhist 
and Confucian positions on issues of doctrine and practice. His intention 
was to show that the Buddhist doctrine was intrinsically flawed. Thus, it 
was not only necess訂yto discipline the Buddhist establishment at the 
present moment: it was desirable to seriously curtail, and if possible, to 
9 For an overview of Jeong’s role in the establishment of the Joseon dynasty, see Chai-shik 
Chung’s, "Chong Tojon：’Architect' of Yi Dynasty Government and Ideology” 
10 Before the fapbyeon Jeong wrote: (1) the Simmun cheondap （心問天答 Questionsfrom the Mind 
Answered by Heaven; 1375), wherein he presented a critique of the Buddhist doctrine of karma, 
offering instead a Neo-Confucian inte中retationof the interaction of principle （理） and material 
force （気，）； (2) the Simgiri pyeon （心気理篇臼lthe Mind, Material Force and Principle; 1394) 
where he carried out a comparative study of the natures of Buddhism, Confucianism and 
Daoism from a Neo-Confucian perspective 
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permanently end the activities of this entire belief system. His critique is 
thorough and systematic, covering every m司oraspect of the Buddhist 
doctrine that was being taught at the time. Given the composition of 
Korean Buddhism at the time in question, the prim訂yo同ectof his 
criticism was the Seon sect, which the Neo-Confucians perceived as 
having strong tendencies toward other副worldliness,toward denial of the 
importance of human relationships, toward denial of respect for the state, 
and even toward denial of Buddhism’s own principle of cause and efect. 
The influence of Jeong' s Chinese predecessors, primarily the Cheng 
brothers and Zhuxi, is omnipresent in his writings. Careful examination 
shows that almost every argt江nent,and every example made by Jeong is 
a citation from one of the Cheng brothers, although often received 
through the commentaries of Zhu. Nonetheless, prior to Jeong, even in 
the works of the Chengs and Zhu, these anti-Buddhist critiques had been 
by and large scattered here and there, not having been assembled in a 
single, systematic essay, which attacked Buddhism from every angle. In 
this regard, the Japbyeon is a 山首que document in the East Asian 
Neo-Confucian tradition. 
The Ar伊 mentsof the Bulssi j伊byeon 
Jeong st訂tsof, in the白rsttwo chapters of the treatise, with a critique 
of the Indian notions of karma and transmigration, arguing against these 
”foreign”Indian paradigms, based on Chinese cosmological schema that 
were developed in connection with the W昭 and its commentaries: 
yinル仰 thefive phases, hun and po so叫s,etc. Critically speaking, these 
chapters do not offer much that would prove a metaphysical high gro国ld
for Confucianism for anyone who knows the classical texts well, as his 
refutation of the doctrine of仕ansmigrationrests on such assertions as a 
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declaration for the non-increase or decrease for the total number of beings 
in the world at a given time-positions that were never really articulated 
as such in the foundational Confucian works. He does make somewhat of 
a point however, in bringing to mind the fact that when it comes to 
practical matters, such as the healing of disease, that virtually al people, 
Buddhists included, rely on Chinese yin/yang cosmology in the form of 
traditional medicinal practices. 
It is in the third through fifth chapters that he really drives into the 
core of his argument with philosophical acumen, as he attacks Buddhism 
at one of its traditional weak points: that of the contradictory character of 
the discourse on the nature and the mind as found in the 
tathagatag訂bha-influencedtexts such as the Awakening of Mahayana Faith, 
Sutra of PeポctEnlightenment, and Sura1略的1a刊 tra.He cites passages from 
the S口rarpgama-satraand from the writings of Jinul that show a clear lack 
of uniformity between the various accounts of the relation between the 
mind心， andthe nature性.As Jeong shows through these citations, in 
one Buddhist text, the nature is equivalent to the mind; in another, it is 
an aspect of the mind; then it is a principle contained in the mind, and 
then in another text, a function of the mind. Referring to the disparities 
and circular reasoning that he finds in the Buddhist descriptions of the 
concept of 1nature,1 he says 
[The Buddhist explanations reg訂dingthe nature are] al done based on 
nebulous supposition, rather than on explicit facts. The teachings of the 
Buddhists have lots of word play, but lack a definitive doctrine, and 
through this, their actual intentions can be understood.(SBJl. 78b)11 
The Confucian teachings, are, by contrast, consistent from beginning to 
end. They clearly distinguish between the mind and its nature, between 
11然皆得於想象努事重之中、而無害谷然真実之見。其説多為遊辞而無一定之論，其情可得失。
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principle and e×temal events. They allow for clear value and evaluation, 
with uniformity throughout. 
This is the learning of our Confucian masters. From inside the body 
and mind, extending out to [al] afairs and things-from the source, 
flowing out to the branch streams. Al are penetrated by one, like the 
water that comes down from the fountainhead to flow out to a myriad 
streams: there is no place where it is not water. It is like holding the 
handle of the Big Dipper, which assesses the worth of al things under 
heaven. The relative worth of those things is just like the weighing of 
zhu and liang on a scale. This is what I mean when I say that there has 
never been an iota of inconsistency. (SBJl. 78b)12 
Therefore I say: Buddhism is void, while Confucianism is substantial; 
Buddhism hasれvorealities, while Confucianism has one; Buddhism has 
gaps, while Confucianism is consistent. This is something that learned 
people should clarify and discem.(S町1.78d)13 
A similar theme carries into the fourth chapter, where Jeong criticizes 
Buddhists, in this case, especially Chan Buddhists, for conflating the 
notion of nature with that of mundane function, citing the likes of 
Layman Pang, who said: "Hauling water and c訂巧ring firewood are 
nothing but marvelous function.”（SBJl. 78d)14 Jeong here cites Zhuxi, who 
said：”if you take functional activity to be [the same as] the nature, then 
訂enot peoples’irresponsible actions such as taking a sword to murder 
someone, and transgressing the way [also] the nature？”（SBJl. 79b)15 This 
line of argument is carried into chapter six, where the focus comes to be 
12此吾儒之学。内自身心、外而至事物、自源t且流。一以通貫、如源頭之水流於万派、無非水也。如持
有星之衡、称量天下之物。其物之軽重勾権衡之録両相称。此所謂元不曾間断者也。
13故目、釈氏虚、吾儒実。釈氏二、吾儒一。釈子間断、吾儒連続。学者所当明弁也。
14廓居土目、連水搬柴無非妙用，是也。
15若以作用為性則人胡乱執万殺人敢道性敗。
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placed directly on the relationship between the mind and its external, 
functional manifestations. To clarify the Confucian position (considered by 
Jeong to be rationally and metaphysically consistent), Jeong cites the 
Mencian "four beginnings＂四端 that訂einnate to humans, along with 
their four associated manifest functions of altruism 仁， propriety 市L,
justice義r and wisdom智．百1eBuddhists, by contrast, espouse doctrines 
that dissociate the innate capacities of the mind from the manifestations of 
human activity. This chapter contains the passage that constitutes the crux 
of Jeong’s argument. He says: 
It is like the saying "essence and function spring from the same source; 
the manifest and the subtle have no gap between them. "16The Buddhist 
method of study addresses the mind, but does not address its 
manifestations. This can be seen in the Buddhist’s saying things like "The 
bodhisattva Manjusri wanders through the taverns, but these activities are 
not his mind.”Excuses for this kind of licentious behavior abound [in the 
Buddhist teachings]. Is this not a separation of the mind from its 
activities? Chengzi said: "The study of the Buddhists includes reverence 
to correct the internal, but does not include justice to s凶 ightenthe 
external.”Therefore those who are stuck in these [incorrect views] will 
waste away.(SBJl. 79c-d)17 
Jeong’s critique runs through several chapters, addressing issues such as 
the Buddhists' abandonment of societal obligations, perverted application 
of the notion of "compassion,1’criticism of the idea of two levels of 
reality, the practice of begging, and most of al, the escapist/nihilistic 
views of Chan. But al can be summarized with Jeong’s view that the 
16 In Zhuxi’s Chuanxilu；，体用一原、顕微無間也 identifiedas a citation from Chengyi, but I have 
not yet located it in Chen窃ri&apos’scolected works 
17亦如此所謂体用一源、顕微無間者也。彼之学取其心、不取其跡。乃目、 文殊大聖遊諸酒感跡雌非
而心則是也。｛宅如此類者、甚多。非心跡之判敗。程子日、仏氏之学於敬以直内則有之笑。 義以方外
則未之有也。故滞園者入於枯楠
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components of the Buddhist doctrine訂edisconnected from each other, 
are contradictory. Buddhist teachings訂econveniently used for excusing 
responsib辺ity, the antithesis of providing a viable system of values. 
Confuci紅白m,by contrast, is completely aligned through essence and 
function, is unit訂y,without contradictions, teaches a concrete system of 
values, and expl担nsa clear relationship between inner and outer. 
The Buddhist Response: The Hyeonjeong non 
I have already outlined Gihwa' s life and background in some detail in 
prior publications, so I will just briefly summarize here.18 Gihwa was 
born in 1376, and was thus thirty-four years 仰せorto Jeong. The son of a 
diplomat, he was considered to be one of the brightest yo国 1gscholars of 
his generation, excelling at the recently established national academy of 
Confucian studies, the Seonggyun’gwan. During the course of his studies 
here, however, he was continually attracted by the Buddhist teachings, 
and went through a period of time when he was confused about which 
course he should follow.19 At the age of 21, the death of a friend finally 
tilted the scales irreversibly in the direction of Buddhism, and he joined 
the order. He eventually became the disciple of the leading Seon master 
of his generation, Jacho 自超（Muhak 無学 1327-1405), under whose 
tutelage he received the Linji-based gong’印刷国ng.Yet at the same time, 
due, no doubt, to the influences of his scholarly background, Gihwa went 
on to become one of the most prolific Buddhist writers of his period, 
bringing influence on the subsequent character of Korean Seon, most 
18 More complete accounts of Gihwa's life are contained in (1) the second chapter of my Ph.D 
disertation, and (2) pages 25-33 of the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment. Excerpts from this are 
available on the web at http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac伊／~ acmuller / spe/ Gihwabio.htm. 
19 Gihwa describes this period of his life and how he came to his final decision in detail in the 
Hyeonjeong non. This episode is further elaborated below. 
36 The Centerpiece of the Goryeo-Joseon Buddhist-Confucian Confrontation 
notably through his commentaries on the Sutra of hポctEnlightenment and 
the Diamond Sutra.20 
Gihwa lived directly in the middle of the period of the dynastic 
仕ansition仕omthe Goryeo to the Joseon, during the course of which the 
Buddhists were司ectedfrom their long and intimate relationship with the 
rulership. During his career as a Seon teacher, Gihwa rose to become the 
leading Buddhist figure of his generation. While the Confucians had 
succeeding in bringing enough pressure to be訂 ineliminating the title of 
National Teacher 国師， whichhad for centuries been granted to the 
leading Buddhist白gures,he was stil, toward the end of his career, 
awarded the title of royal preceptor王師， whichreflects the degree of 
respect that Gihwa commanded, despite the changing times. This also 
means that he, as the leader of the Korean sangha during this period, was 
the one who ended up being faced with the prim紅yresponsibility of 
responding to the Neo-Confucian polemic. 
Gihwa did respond, in the form of a treatise entitled the Hyeonjeong 
non顕正論.A date of composition is not attached to the version of the 
Hyeonjeong non in our possession, nor is there any clear dating 
information provided in Gihwa’s biographical sketch. We do know that he 
had to have composed it after the time of his conversion to Buddhism in 
1396-7, and we might also assume, given the strong mastery of Buddhist 
doctrine demonstrated in the treatise, that it would have been composed 
several years after this conversion, and thus several years after Jeong’s 
demise in 1398.百lerefore,strictly speaking, this text cannot be seen as 
constituting a "live debate" with Jeong. 
20 Gihwa’s commentary to the Sutra of Peψct Enlψtemnent is caled Daebanggwang wean’gak sudara 
yoeuigyeong seoreui；，大方広円覚修多羅了義経説誼 HBJ7. 12-169. His commentary to the Diamond 
Sutra is the Geumgang banya baramilgyeong oga hae seoreui; 金剛般若波羅蜜経五家解説誼
(Annotation to the Redaction of Five Commentaries on the Diamond Sutra ). HBJ 7. 10-107. I 
have translated the former work in ful in The Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment: Korean Buddhism’S 
Guide to Meditation 
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On the other hand however, the Hyeonjeong non directly responds to 
every one of the o同ectionsraised in the ]apbyeo叫 whichrepresented the 
c叫rninationof al the Confucian arguments that had been made against 
Buddhism from the time of Hanyu onward, and after the ]apbyeon, such a 
direct, systematic, philosophical critique of Buddhism from the Confucians 
was never ag泊nto appe訂.So it can be said that it is almost exclusively 
the ]apbyeon to which Gihwa is making his response. 
To set the tone for his argument, Gihwa goes to some lengths to 
clarify the Buddhist position on the nature of the mind, the relevance, of, 
and gradations of methods of practices-basically summ訂izingthe view 
of mind that is expressed in the fundamental East Asian Buddhist 
scriptures, the Awakening of M伽 yanaFaith, Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment, 
etc. That is, that the mind is originally pure, but when it moves into 
activity, it has the potential to be distorted. Gihwa opens the Hyeonjeong 
non by say加g:
Though its essence is neither existent nor non-existent, it peロneates
existence and non-existence.百oughit originally lacks past and present, 
it permeates past and present: this is the Dao. Existence and 
non-existence are based in nature and discriminations. Past and present 
are based in birth-and-death. The nature originally lacks discrimination, 
but when you are confused about the nature you 羽田 discriminations;
with the production of discriminations, wisdom is blocked-thoughts 
transform and the essence is differentiated. It is through this that the 
myriad forms take shape and birth-and-death begin.(HBJ 7. 217a)21 
In this way, Gihwa starts off by grounding his argument in an 
essence-function view of the 紅白ld and its activities. The mind is 
originally pure, but as it engages in situations, it can become entangled in 
21体非有無而通於有無本無古今而通於古今者道也有無因於性情也古今因於生死也性本無情迷性
生情情生智隔想変体殊万象所以形也生死所以始也。
ιこー
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dif白culties.For the purpose of recovering the original mind, Buddhism 
has a wide spectn江nof practices, which range from the most expedient, 
or super白cial,to the most profound. In outlining the teaching starting 
from the most profound and extending to the most superficial, he ends 
up with the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of the law of cause and efect. 
Yet no matter how super白cialthe. Buddhist teaching of cause and e丘ect
may seem within the East Asian Mahayana tradition, Gihwa judges it to 
be one level above the typical application of the Confucian teaching, 
which he defines as the mere conditioning of people through reward and 
punishment on the part of the state. But he subsequently takes another 
tack, arguing that the Confucian teachings, when properly understood and 
practiced, mesh perfectly with the Buddhist teaching of cause and efect, 
and thus can be seen as being applicable at profound levels. 
In terms of overall tone, the Hyeonjeong non is quite conc日iatory
compared to the Japbyeon. Gihwa has no intention of discrediting the 
Confucian tradition as a whole. Rather, his aim is to point out the 
underlying 山utyof the three teachings, and to see them as varying 
expressions of a mysterious山首fyingprinciple.官官 Confucianteachings 
are good, and valuable. The main problem is that they have been 
in coπectly transmitted and practiced by even the most important figures 
of their own tradition. 
Gihwa defends the charges made ag出nstBuddhist practices that are 
seen to be antisocial, such as the abandonment of the f恒国lyrelationships, 
by showing how they are actually helpful to society, rather than harmful, 
when practiced correctly. Excesses indulged in by sangha members are 
attributed to the responsibility of the offenders as individuals making 
their own decisions, rather than to the tradition as a whole. Criticisms of 
the Buddhist doctrines of karma and causation are dealt with by logical 
紅 gumentation,showing that the law of cause and effect cannot but be 
universally valid; criticisms of the doctrine of rebirth are defended with 
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anecdotes of people who have memories of past lives. 
The core of Gihwa’S訂伊江nentlies in the presentation of what he takes 
as common denominator of al three traditions (Confucianism, Daoism and 
Buddhism): a shared doctrine of altruism, based on the universally 
expressed assumption that the myriad living beings of the universe are 
fully interlinked with one another. While the notion of the mutual 
containment of al things is Buddhist in origin, it ended up being one of 
the central tenets of the most influential of the Song Neo-Confucian 
founders, especially Chenghao, who declared that”百lemyriad things and 
I form a single body."22 With this being the seminal Neo-Confucian 
development of the Confucian/Mencian "humanity”（ren/in 仁） Gihwa 
finds an inconsistency between what Confucians say and what they do. 
The issue of this inconsistency (or perhaps, hypocrisy) becomes t恥
lynchpin of Gihwa’s argument. 
Buddhism and (Neo-)Confucianism share in the view that it is 
fundamentally wrong to harm others. Buddhists have the doctrine of 
ahirpsa (non-injury) at the core of their practice of moral discipline, and 
this is observed fully in al Buddhist practices. Confucians, on the other 
hand, take ren as the most fundamental component of their path of 
cultivation. Confucius himself continually cited ren as the source of al 
forms of goo也1es. Mencius said that 陀nwas innate to al people, 
explaining its function through a v紅白ty of metaphors, the most 
oft-repeated being that of the stranger who automatically rushes to 
prevent a toddler仕omfalling into a well.23 
However, Gihwa says, the Confucian corpus is rife with inconsistencies 
on this matter. For example, although Chenghao has told us that ren 
22 Honan erh-ch'eng i-shu, p. 15. Also se Chan 1969: 530, section no. 11. This line comes from the 
same section of Chenghao’s Yishu that contains most of the philosophical arguments that form 
the basis for Jeong’s arguments in the f apbyeon 
23 Mencius, 28:1 
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means that we form a single body with the myriad things, Confucius 
himself only went halfway in his practice of single-bodiedness, as he stil 
killed animals in the course of his 叫oymentof the sports of hunting and 
fishing. For Mencius, the taking of life of m 出limalwas not problematic 
for the ren man, as long as he di也ずthear the animal’s sere田nsin its 
death throes. And, in general, the Confucian tradition fully endorsed the 
practices of ritual sacri白ce.Gihwa says: 
The Analects say：”When the master fished he would not use a net; 
when hunting he would not shoot a perched bird.”（Analects, 7:26) 
Mencius said；”The superior man stays f訂 awayfrom the kitchen. If he 
hears the screams of the animals he c氾motbear to eat their flesh." 
(Mencius, 1A:7) These are al examples of incompletely actualized ren 
Why don’t they t町 tocome up to the level of ”forming a single body"? 
The Doctrine of the Mean says：”His words reflecting his actions, his 
actions reflecting his words-how can this Superior Man君子 notbe 
sincere through and through?"24 Whom among those I have cited here 
comes up to this level? This is an example of the Confucians preaching 
about the goodness of the path of ren but not following through. Ifit is 
necessary to place limits on the killing of birds, why even shoot the 
arrow at al? If it bothers you to shoot a perched bird, why shoot it 
when it is flying? If the superior man is going to avoid the kitchen, why 
does he eat meat at all?25 
Later on, he says: 
[Since animals share, with people] the sense of aversion to being killed, 
24 Doctrine ofthe Mean, section 13 of the commentary. Cited from 
http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac伊／－acmuller/con tao/ docofmean.htm. 
お論語云釣而不綱 一℃不射宿 孟子云君子遠庖厨也聞其声不忍食其肉 又云数害不入汚池 魚、簡不可勝
食此皆為仁而未尽其道也何不契於一己之言乎 中庸云 言顧行行顧言君子胡不憶憶繭 今何至此乎
此儒者之所以善論為仁之道而未尽善也 既要殺少 何必発矢 既憐其宿 何射不宿 既遠庖厨何必食肉。
(HBJ 7. 2129b吋
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how do they differ from human beings? With the sound of ripping flesh 
and the cu仕ingof the knife, they are in utter fright as they approach 
their death. Their eyes are wild and they c町 outin agony. How could 
they not harbor bitterness and resentment? And yet people are able to 
tum a deaf e訂.In this way human beings and the creatures of the world 
affect each other without awareness and compensate each other without 
pause. If there were a man of ren present, how could he observe such 
suffering and continue to act as if nothing was wrong?26 
41 
As Gihwa goes on to tel us, it was precisely the di丘町enceon this 
point that turned him toward Buddhism during the period of time when 
he was weighing the two systems in the balance.27 
The ch紅 ge, then, that Gihwa wants to lay on the Confucians, is 
strikingly simil訂 tothat which Jeong uses to assail the Buddhists, in that 
both want to show the other side to be g山lty of inconsistency. 百1e
difference, however, is that Jeong wants to point out inconsistencies in the 
Buddhist doctrine in itself, where Gihwa centers his argument on showing 
26至於好生悪殺之情亦何嘗異於人哉 方其殊然奏万恕然、就死之時時時然視白白然鳴量非合怨結恨之
情状也而人自昧耳所以人句物相作而不覚 相償而無休安有仁人見其如是而忍為之裁。（HBJ7. 
220a-b) 
27 During the time before he entered the sarig加， Gihwawas receiving instruction from a monk 
named Haeweol, who raised for him the problem of the incongruence of Chenghao’s "forming a 
single body" with Mencius' condoning of the slaughter of livestock. Gihwa wrestled with this 
problem for a period of time, and eventually resolved it. In the Hyeonjeong non, he explains 
how he came to this resolution：”I was completely stymied by this question, and could not 
answer it. 1 pondered over al of the clasical transmissions, and could not come up with a 
single text that could support a principle that condoned the taking of life・Iinquired widely 
among the brightest thinkers of the day, but not one of them could ofer an explanation that 
could resolve my perplexity.η1is doubt remained within my mind for a long time without 
being resolved. Then, while traveling around Mt. Samgak in 1396, I arrived to Seungga-sa, 
where I had the chance to chat with an old Seon monk throughout the night. The monk said: 
’The Buddha has ten grave precepts, the first of which not kiling.’Upon hearing this 
explanation, my mind was suddenly overturned, and I recognized for myself that this was 
indeed the action of the true man of ren, and I was able to deeply embody the teachings of the 
Way of ren. From this time forth, I was never again to be confused regarding the differences 
between Confucianism and Buddhism.”（HBJ 7. 20a). 
42 The Centerpiece of the Goryeo-Joseon Buddhist-Confucian Confrontation 
inconsistencies between Confucian doctrine and practice. That is, 
Confuci副首 sayone thing, but do another. Gihwa's final pronouncement of 
his treatise, however, is the conclusion that the three teachings, when 
properly understood, should be seen as three types of expression of the 
S出nereality. Here he no doubt had in mind the concluding chapter of 
Jeong’s treatise, entitled ℃riticisrn of the Differences Between Buddhism 
and Confucianism”儒釈同異之弁．百1ere,Jeong gives a final summation of 
al the ways that the Buddhist teaching is vacuous and nihilistic and thus 
inferior to Confucianism, which is substantial and consistent throughout. 
百1ere,Jeong says: 
Prior Confucian scholars have [already] shown that the Confucian and 
Buddhist paths differ with eveηsingle phrase and eve可 singlesituation 
Here I will elaborate based on these [precedents]. We say voidness, and 
they also say voidness. We say quiescence, and they also say quiescence. 
However, our voidness is void yet existent目 Theirvoidness is void and 
non-existent. Our quiescence is quiescent yet aware; their quiescence is 
quiescent and nihilating. We speak of knowledge and action; they speak 
of awakening and cultivation. Yet O旧 knowledgeis to know that the 
principle of the myriad things is replete in our own minds. Their 
awakening awakens to the fact that the mind that is originally empty, 
lacking anything. Our action is to return to the principle of the myriad 
things and act according to it, without error. Their cultivation is to sever 
connection with the myriad things and regard them as unconnected to 
one’s mind. (SBJl. 84a)28 
Gihwa, in obvious reference to Jeong’s summation, also concludes his 
own 訂 gurnent by focusing on these two concepts of voidness and 
28先儒謂儒釈之道。 句句而事事異。今且因是而推広之此日虚。彼亦日虚。此日寂、彼亦日寂。然此之
虚、虚而有。彼之虚、虚而無。此之寂、寂而感。彼之寂、寂而滅。此日知行、彼自悟修。此之知、
知万物之理、具於吾心也。 彼之悟、悟此心本空無一物也。 此之行、循万物之理而行之。無所違失
也。彼之修、絶去万物而不為吾心之累也。
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quiescence by showing instead, that the connotations of these terms are 
basically the same throughout al three traditions, and that indeed, at their 
most fundamental level, the three are equally valid approaches to the 
same reality. It is this section that provides the most concrete evidence 
that Gihwa was most certainly responding to Jeong when he wrote this 
essay. 
If you can grasp this, then the words of the three teachers fit together 
like the broken pieces of the same board-as if they had al come out of 
the same mouth! If you would like to actually demonstrate the high and 
low among these teachings, exposing their points of simil訂ityand 
difference clearly in their actual function, then you must first completely 
wash the pollution from your mind and completely clarify your eye of 
wisdom. Then you can study al of the texts contained in the Buddhist, 
Confucian and Daoist canons. Compare them in your daily activities, at 
the times of birth and death, fortune and misfortune. Without needing 
words, you will spontaneously nod in assent. How strong do I need to 
make my argument to get the prince to listen? (HBJ 7. 225b)29 
The much softer stance of Gihwa can be attributable to various factors. 
First, throughout the intellectual history of East Asia, it had never been 
p紅 tof the Buddhist response to try to directly refute the Confucian 
tradition, for as Chinese, and Koreans, it was, indeed, their tradition.30 
Although Gihwa, who had taken his literary training in a Confucian 
academy, eventually opted for Buddhism to complete his spiritual quest, 
he never lost his deep respect for the more profo町1daspects of both 
29拠此則参家所言冥相符契而如出一口也若履践之高低発用之同異則洗尽心垢廓清慧自然後看尽
大蔵儒道諸書参於日用之間生死禍福之際則不待言而自点頭尖吾何強弁以草案君聴
30 A good巴xampl巴 forthis point is the Yuanren lun；原人論 byZongrni, which includes an 
important chapt釘 onth巴凶ati on 
Confucianism and Daoism in the status of a lower order than the Buddhist teachings, they are 
nonetheless taken to b巴partof a continuum of ultimately valid teachings. Like Gihwa, Zongmi 
was noted for the depth of his Confucian learning prior to entering the Buddhist order 
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Confucianism and Daoism. Indeed he cites from the Chinese classics with 
regularity in his Buddhist commentaries. We might even町laginethat it 
町田yhave p出nedhim considerably to be forced into the position of 
having to criticize Confucianism in the Hyeonjeong non. 
In any case, at least after the time of the transmission of Buddhism out 
of India, philosophical exchanges of this type, and of this level, between 
Buddhists and the thinkers of competing religious traditions are extremely 
rare. For our own selfish edification, we, as intellectual historians, can 
only wish that Jeong had lived long enough to be able to enter into 
rejoinder with Gihwa here. 
Abbreviations 
HBJ = Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo韓国仏教全書
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